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Abstract—Mobile sensors have already proved to be helpful to different
aspects of people’s everyday lives such as fitness, gaming, navigation,
etc. However, illegitimate access to these sensors provides a malicious
program running with an exploit path. While the users are benefiting
from richer and more personalized apps, the growing number of sensors
introduces new security and privacy risks to end users, and makes
the task of sensor management more complex. In this paper, first we
discuss the issues around security and privacy of mobile sensors. Second,
we reflect the results of a workshop which we organized on mobile
sensor security. Finally, we provide recommendations for educators,
app developers and mobile users to contribute toward awareness and
education on this topic.
1 Introduction
According to the Economist [7], smartphones have become the
fastest-selling gadgets in history, outselling personal comput-
ers (PCs) four to one. Today about half the adult population
owns a smartphone; by 2020, 80% will. Mobile device vendors
are increasingly augmenting their products with different
types of sensors such as NFC (near field communication),
accelerometer, orientation and motion, which are connected
to each other through the Internet of Things (IoT).
Sensors are added to mobile devices to make them
“smart”: to sense the surrounding environment and infer
aspects of the context of use from the sensor data, and thus to
facilitate more meaningful interactions with the user. Many
of these sensors are used in popular mobile apps such as
fitness and games. Mobile sensors have also been proposed
for security purposes, e.g. authentication [3], [6], authoriza-
tion [16], device pairing [17], and secure contactless payment
[19]. However, malicious access to sensor streams provides an
installed app running in the background with an exploit path.
Researchers have shown that the user’s PINs and passwords
can be disclosed through sensors such as camera and micro-
phone [25], ambient light [28], and gyroscope [35]. Sensors
such as NFC can also be misused to attack financial payments
as demonstrated in [18].
In our previous research [20]–[23], we have shown that
the sensor management problem is spreading from apps to
browsers. We proposed the first JavaScript-based side chan-
nel attack revealing user touch actions (click, hold, scroll,
and zoom) and PINs on mobile phones. In this attack, the
JavaScript code embedded in the attack web page listens to
the motion and orientation sensor streams without needing
any permission from the user. By analysing these streams via
machine learning algorithms, our attack infers the user’s touch
actions and PIN with an accuracy of over 70% in the first try.
The above research has attracted considerable national
and international media coverage (newspaper, radio, tv, on-
line news, social media, etc.) – which reassures the importance
of the topic. Examples of the media articles and interviews
include: Guardian [12], BBC [24], Telegraph [4], Economic
Times (a leading business newspaper) [31], Science Friday
(American radio talk show) [8], German public radio Deutsch-
landfunk [15], Sina (largest Chinese-language web portal) [26],
Lavoz (a leading Spanish-language newspaper) [30], etc.
We disclosed the identified vulnerability described in the
above to the industry. While working with W3C and browser
vendors (Google Chromium, Mozilla Firefox, Apple, etc.) to
fix the problem, we came to appreciate the complexity of the
sensor management problem in practice and the challenge of
balancing security, usability and functionality. The results of
our previous research [20], [23] show that mobile users are not
generally familiar with most sensors. In addition, we observed
that there is a significant disparity between the actual and
perceived risk levels of sensors. In [23], we discuss how this
observation, along with other factors, renders many academic
and industry solutions ineffective in managing mobile sensors.
In view of all this, we believe that there is a lot of room for
more focus on people awareness and education about the pri-
vacy and security issues of the mobile and sensor technology.
In the past, we had studied the impact of providing the
sensors descriptions to mobile users on the perceived risk
levels for a particular scenario: stealing PINs via a background
app which has access to all sensors [23]. In this paper, we
present the results of a more advanced teaching method –
working with sensor-enabled apps – on the risk level that users
associate with the same PIN discovery scenario. We reflect the
results of an interactive workshop that we organized on mobile
sensor security. This workshop covered the following: an intro-
duction of mobile sensors and their applications, working with
sensor-enabled mobile apps, an introduction of the security
and privacy issues of mobile sensors, and an overview on how
to manage the app permissions on different mobile platforms.
In Section 3, we present the structure of the workshop in full
details.
2Category Sensors
Identity-related GPS, Camera, Microphone,
(Biometric) Fingerprint (TouchID), Touch Screen
Communicational WiFi, Bluetooth, NFC
Movement Gyroscope, Accelerometer, Rotation,
Orientation, Motion, Sensor Hub
Ambient Temperature (ambient, device), Humidity,
(Environmental) Pressure (Barometer), Light, Proximity,
Gravity, Magnetic Field, Hall Sensor
TABLE 1
Categorization of current mobile sensors
2 Mobile sensors
As shown in [29], the average number of permissions used
by Android apps (installed from Google Play) increases over
time, especially for popular apps as well as free apps. These
permissions are requested for having access to the OS re-
sources as well as sensors such as GPS, camera, and micro-
phone. This has the potential to make apps over-privileged
and unnecessarily increase the attack surface.
Developers can have access to mobile sensors either by
1) writing native code using mobile operating system (OS)
APIs [9], 2) recompiling HTML5 code into a native app [14],
or 3) using standard APIs provided by the W3C which are
accessible through JavaScript code within a mobile browser1.
As shown in Table 2, both iOS and Android as well as
mobile web browsers allow native apps and JavaScript code
in web pages to access many of these sensors without any user
permission being required.
2.1 Mobile sensors categorization
Here we present a list of different sensors, borrowing it from
our previous research [23]. This list was prepared by inspect-
ing the official websites of iPhone 62, Nexus 6P3, and the
specifications that W3C4 and Android [9] provide for devel-
opers. We also add some extra sensors (wireless technologies,
camera, microphone, touch screen, and GPS) as common sens-
ing mobile hardware. We propose to categorize these sensors
into four main groups: identity-related (biometric) sensors,
communicational sensors, movement sensors, and ambient
(environmental) sensors, as presented in Table 1. Note that
this list can be even longer if all mobile brands are included.
For example, the world’s first thermal imaging sensor on
mobile phones is offered by Cat S60 smartphone5. We chose
movement instead ofmotion for sensors such as accelerometer,
gyroscope, etc. on purpose since ‘motion’ is already taken by
W3C specifications for a limited list of sensors in this category
[33]. One might argue that GPS belongs to the environmental
category, however since it is assigned with people’s identities,
we propose to keep it in the identity-related category. In
Appendix A, we present a brief description of each sensor.
2.2 Sensor management challenges
As it can be seen in Table 2, sensing is unmanaged on
existing smartphone platforms. The in-app access to certain
1. w3.org/TR/#tr_Javascript_APIs
2. apple.com/uk/iphone-6/specs/
3. store.google.com/product/nexus_6p
4. w3.org/2009/dap/
5. catphones.com/en-gb/phones/s60-smartphone
Sensor Android iOS W3C
GPS 3 3 3
Camera 3 3 3
Microphone 3 3 3
Fingerprint/ TouchID 3 3 NA
Touch Screen 7 7 7
WiFi 3 3 7
Bluetooth 3 3 3
NFC 7* Locked 7
Accelerometer 7 7 7
Rotation 7 7 7
Gyroscope 7 7 7
Motion 7 7 7
Orientation 7 7 7
Sensor Hub Locked Locked NA
Proximity 7 7 7
Ambient Light 7 7 7
Ambient Pressure/ Barometer 7 7 NA
Ambient Humidity 7 NA NA
Ambient Temperature 7 NA NA
Device Temperature 7 NA NA
Gravity 7 7 NA
Magnetic Field 7 7 7
Hall Sensor 7 NA NA
TABLE 2
Current permission policies of sensors on different platforms, 3:
permission required, 7: permission not required, NA: not supported,
and Locked: not open to developers. *NFC should be turned on
manually in Android for any program to be able to use it.
sensors including GPS, camera, and microphone requires user
permission when installing and running the app. However,
as discussed in [25], an attacker can easily trick a user into
granting permission through social engineering (e.g. present-
ing it as a free game app). Once the app is installed, usage of
the sensor data is not restricted. Even worse, access to many
other sensors including accelerometer, gyroscope, and light is
unrestricted; any app can have free access to the sensor data
without needing any user permission, as these sensors are left
unmanaged in operating systems. As it can be seen in Table 2,
permission policies for having access to different sensors vary
across sensors and platforms [2], [32].
Although the information leakage caused by sensors has
been known for years [25], [28], [35], the problem has remained
unsolved in practice. One main reason is the complexity of the
problem; keeping the balance between security and usability.
Another reason, from the practical perspective, is that all
the reported attacks depend on one condition: the user must
initiate the downloading and installing of the app. Therefore,
users are relied upon to be vigilant and not to install untrusted
apps. Furthermore, it is expected that app stores such as the
Apple app store and Google Play will screen the apps, and
impose severe penalties if the app is found to contain malicious
content. However, in our in-browser-based attacks [20]–[23],
we have demonstrated that these measures are ineffective.
With the growing number of sensors, and more sensitive
sensor hardware provisioned with new mobile devices and
other IoT devices, the problem of information leakage caused
by sensors is expected to become more severe. Our previous
research suggests that users are not aware of i) the data
generated by the sensors, ii) how that data might be used
to undermine their security and privacy, and iii) what pre-
cautionary measure they could and should take. Given that,
we believe that raising public knowledge about the sensor
technology through education is a very timely matter.
33 Workshop
This 90-min workshop entitled “What Your Sensors Say About
You” 6 was organized as one of the four workshops hosted
by the Thinking Digital Women conference in Nov 2016 at
Newcastle University. The attendees could find the following
description of the workshop on the event page: “Mobile sen-
sors are everywhere. They’re in our smartphones, our tablets
and our wearables. They help our devices to detect movement,
sense changes in pressure, and notice when other devices are
nearby. The data they provide help us to enjoy richer and
more personalised apps. But what are the risks to our phones,
and the information that lies within them? Discover how these
sensors may introduce new security risks to phone users, and
make it more complicated to manage them.”
3.1 Pedagogical approach
Our teaching approach, which incorporates taught and re-
search dissemination activities, embodies the principles of
constructive alignment and constructivist learning theory. In
particular, we deliberately introduce a number of periods of
reflection throughout the workshop. Attendees are supported
in considering various preventative measures in relation to
permission-granting in sensor-related apps, and extrapolate
their future impacts.
A widely adopted theory in the public understanding of
scientific research, is that of the “deficit model" [34]. The
deficit model acknowledges that a lack of available information
leads to a lack of popular understanding, which in turn fosters
skepticism and hostility. Through our public engagement
exercise, and by making available our resources, we seek
to equip the public with accessible information which may
inform reasonable precautionary behaviour.
The authors of this paper adopt a challenging role, both
as researchers active in mobile sensor security, and mediators
seeking to popularise research findings. This leads to a tension
between providing lay and specialist explanations, a perennial
issue in science communication [27].
We acknowledge the role popularisation of science plays
in informing future iterations of research [5], [13]. Indeed our
observations of participants interactions serve to inform future
technological interventions to support mobile sensor security.
3.2 Participants
Workshop participation was voluntary, with conference at-
tendees selecting among four parallel workshops. We (the
first two authors of the paper) presented the workshop to an
audience of 27 female, and 3 male participants, aged between
22 to 51. The attendees owned iOS and Android phones
for an average of 8 years. Full details of the participants
demography is presented in Appendix A. The workshop had
more female participants due to the title and remit of the host
conference: Thinking Digital Women. We acknowledge that
our participant set was less diverse as opposed to our previous
studies [23]. However, we believe the bias in the participants
would not disprove the results of this work since they are
compatible with the results of our previous studies, as we
discuss later. The workshop attendees were sitting on tables
of 5 or 6 and could interact with each other and the educators
during the workshop.
6. tdcwomen.com/workshops/what-your-sensors-say-about-you/
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Fig. 1. The workshop structure
3.3 Workshop content
We ran the workshop by presenting a PowerPoint file, which
is publicly available via the first author’s homepage7. These
slides contain all the general and technical content delivered
to the attendees, and the individual/group exercises they were
asked to complete. We explicitly explained to the participants
whether they need to complete an activity individually or
in group. We also observed them during the workshop to
make sure everyone is following the instructions. We explained
to the attendees that their feedback during the workshop,
through completing a few forms, will be used for a research
project.
This workshop was organised in three parts, as shown
in Fig. 1. In part one, we went through the current mobile
sensors a) by providing the participants with a description
of sensors, and b) working with sensor-enabled apps. In part
two, we explained the sensor-based attacks that we have
performed on sensitive user information such as touch actions
and PINs [20]–[23]. Finally, in part three, we discussed mobile
app permission settings.
3.4 Part One: Sensor Knowledge
Activity one (general knowledge questionnaire): Af-
ter a brief introduction about the workshop, we asked the
participants to fill in a five-point scale self-rated familiarity
questionnaire on a list of 25 different sensors listed in Section
2.1 (see Appendix A). We have been consistently using this
form in our previous research [23]. In this form, we ask the
users to express the level of the general knowledge they have
on each sensor by choosing one of the following: “I’ve never
heard of this”, “I’ve heard of this, but I don’t know what this
is”, “I know what this is, but I don’t know how this works”, “I
know generally how this works” and “I know very well how
this works”. This was an individual exercise, with the list of
sensors was randomly ordered for each user to minimise bias.
Activity two (description of sensors): After com-
pleting the knowledge form, we asked the participants to
go through the description of each sensor (see Appendix A)
on a printed paper given to everyone. This was a group
activity and the participants could help each other for a better
understanding. In case of any difficulty, the attendees were
7. homepages.cs.ncl.ac.uk/m.mehrnezhad/
4Fig. 2. Android (left) and iOS (right) sensor apps used in the workshop
encouraged to interact with the educators. After everyone
went through the description page, we gave them examples
of the usage of each sensor, e.g. motion senors for gaming, and
NFC for contactless payment.
Activity three (installing sensor apps): Afterwards,
we asked the participants to visit the app stores on their
devices and download and install a particular sensor-enabled
app (sensor app). Sensor apps are those which visually allow
the users to choose different sensors on the screen and see
its functionality. For Android users, we recommended the
participants to install Sensor Box for Android8, as shown in
Fig. 2, left. This app detects most of the available sensors on
the device, and visually shows the user how they work. This
app supports the following sensors: accelerometer, gyroscope,
orientation, gravity, light, temperature, proximity, pressure,
and sound. For iPhone users, we recommended Sensor Kinet-
ics app9, as shown in Fig. 2, right. In contrast to the Android
app, this app mainly supports movement sensors (gyroscope,
magnetometer, linear accelerometer, gravity, attitude).
Both apps were chosen based on the popularity, number
of installs, rating, and the features they offered. We also had
a few extra Android phones with the sensor app installed on
them. These phones were offered to participants who were
unable to install the app and use their own phones. Since the
features offered by the Android sensor app were richer, we
made sure that each table has at least one Android phone.
This was a group activity and the attendees could help each
other to find the app in the store and install it. We observed
that all users were able to install the app, except two cases who
had connection and storage problems. We lend the Android
phones to these users.
Activities four and five (working with the sensor
apps): At this point, we invited the participants to work
with the installed apps on their devices. We asked everyone
to go through each sensor and find out about its functionality
by using the app. Meanwhile, the participants were advised
to keep the sensor description page to refer to if necessary.
This was a group activity and the participants could exchange
ideas on the app and sensors as well as helping each other to
8. play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=imoblife.androidsensorbox
&hl=en_GB
9. https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/sensor-
kinetics/id579040333?mt=8
understand the sensors better. During this activity, we worked
with individuals either separately or in small groups of two or
three and reviewed at least two sensors in the app, including
one movement sensor, using the Android app. Through this
pair-working activity, we made sure all participants have the
chance to observe a few different sensors on the Android device
since it offered more features in comparison to the iOS app.
At the end of these activities, by asking the participants to
review the sensor description page again (activity five), we
made sure nobody expressed difficulties in understanding the
general functionality of mobile sensors.
Activity six (concern level questionnaire): At this
stage, we wanted to assess the effect of teaching about sensors
to mobile users – via working with mobile sensor apps – on
the perceived risk level for each sensor. Similar to our previous
research [23], we described a specific scenario: “Now that you
have more knowledge about the sensors, let us describe a
scenario here. Imagine that you own a smartphone which is
equipped with all these sensors. You have opened a game app
which can have access to all mobile sensors. You leave the
game app open in the background, and open your banking
app which requires you to enter your PIN. Do you think any of
these sensors can help the game app to discover your entered
PIN? To what extent are you concerned about each sensor’s
risk to your PIN? Please rate them in the table. In this part,
please make sure that you know the functionality of all the
sensors. If you are unsure, please have another look at the
descriptions, or ask us about them.”
Then we asked each participants to fill in a questionnaire
(see Appendix A) which included five different level of con-
cerns: “Not concerned”, “A little concerned”, “Moderately
concerned”, “Concerned”, and “Extremely concerned”. At the
end of this individual activity, we asked the participants
to complete a demography form. This form included: age,
gender, profession(optional), first language (optional), mobile
device brand, and the duration of owning a smartphone.
3.5 Part two: sensor attacks
After a short break, we presented the work we have done on
mobile sensor security [20]–[23]. In particular, we explained
the attacks that we have performed on user sensitive informa-
tion by using motion and orientation sensors via JavaScript.
These attacks could reveal phone call timing, physical activi-
ties (sitting, walking, running, etc.), touch actions (click, hold,
scroll, zoom), and PINs. For the exact content presented in
this part, please see the PowerPoint file.
3.6 Part three: app permissions
After another short break, we explained the problem of over-
privileged apps to the participants. We showed two examples
of such apps: Calorie Counter-MyFitnessPaland Sensor Box
for Android (the one that we used in this workshop). Fig.
3 shows the permissions that these apps ask for. As it can
be seen, both apps ask for extra permissions e.g. Sensor Box
does not need to have access to WiFi and Device ID and call
information. Similarly, MyFitnessPal does not need to have
access to many of those listed in the picture.
Activity seven: permission review of installed sen-
sor apps. In this group activity, we invited the participants
to go to the system settings of their mobile phones (or the
5Fig. 3. Examples of over privileged apps
Fig. 4. Sensor apps permissions: Android (left), iOS (right)
borrowed ones) and check the permissions of the sensor app
that they installed during the workshop. We also explained to
them that in both Android and iOS devices, it is possible to
disable the pre-granted access to sensors or other OS resources
via the system settings, as shown in Fig. 4 10.
Activity eight: permission review of three pre-
installed apps. At this stage, we asked the participants to
go through the pre-installed apps on their own devices and
chose three apps to review their permissions. We asked them
to individually complete a form by naming the app, explaining
the purpose of the app, listing the (extra) permissions, and
expressing whether they would uninstall it, and why? This
form is provided in Appendix A.
At the end of this workshop, we invited the attendees to
discuss their opinions on mobile sensor security with their
peers and the educators.
4 Results
In this section, we present the results of our analysis on
different stages of the workshop.
4.1 General knowledge
Recall that our participants completed the general knowledge
form in the beginning of the workshop, before being presented
10. The option of limiting the access to While Using the App was
discussed with iPhone users.
with any information. We present this knowledge level in a
stacked bar chart in Fig. 5. As it can be seen, we have catego-
rized these sensors in four groups, as suggested in Section 2.1.
In each category, sensors are ordered based on the aggregate
percentage of participants declaring they know generally or
very well how each sensor works. This aggregate percentage is
shown on the right-hand side. In the case of equal percentage,
the sensor with a bigger share on being known very well by
the participants is shown earlier.
When reading the sensor description page, our partici-
pants were generally surprised to hear about some sensors and
impressed by the variety. As it can be seen in Fig. 5:
• Our participants knew identity-related sensors (very)
well. Although most of these sensors have been avail-
able on mobile devices for a longer time, Fingerprint
and TouchID came out during 2014 and 2015.
• Apart from NFC (which was extensively adopted by
users after the introduction of ApplePay in late 2014),
other communicational sensors (WiFi and Bluetooth)
were known to the users. When we explained the
usage of NFC for contactless payment, our users could
recognize it, though its name did not contribute to
their knowledge they expressed for it.
• Low-level hardware sensors such as accelerometer and
gyroscope seem to be less known to the users in com-
parison with high-level software ones such as motion,
orientation, and rotation, which were named after their
functionalities.
• Our participants were generally not familiar with am-
bient sensors. Some of these sensors, such as ambient
light, device temperature, gravity and barometer were
better known to the users.
Identity-related and communicational sensors were better
known to the users in comparison to the other two categories.
We suspect that this is due to the fact that these sensors
have explicit use cases (such as taking picture, unlocking the
phone, exchanging files) which users can easily associate with.
In contrast, the usage of ambient and movements sensor is
not immediately clear to the users. These explicit use cases
contribute to a better knowledge people express for the first
two categories.
4.2 Perceived risks of sensors
Similar to the above, we present the level of the concern our
participants had for each sensor. Following our previous work
[23], we limit our study to the level of perceived risks users
associate with their PINs being discovered by each sensor
since finding one’s PIN is a clear and intuitive security risk.
Note that when our participants completed the concern form,
they had not been given with any security knowledge about
sensors. This activity was done after they had the description
about sensors, and worked with the sensor apps. As it can be
seen in Fig. 6:
• Except a few identity-related and communicational
sensors, people are generally not concerned, or in some
cases only a little concerned, about the risks of sensors
to their PINs.
• In the case of the identity-related and communica-
tional sensors, there are only a few sensors which some
6Fig. 5. Self-declared knowledge level of sensors
of our participants were (extremely) concerned regards
to their PIN being compromised. These sensors include
Camera, Touch screen, Fingerprint, TouchID, WiFi,
Bluetooth, and NFC.
• There is a considerable gap between the level of the
expressed concern in this study in comparison to the
studies we have done in the past [23]. Our participants
expressed less concern when they knew the sensor de-
scription and worked with sensor apps in the workshop
in comparison to when they only knew the description
of the sensors via individual interviews [23].
We concluded in our previous work that providing only
the description of mobile sensors, would not effect the con-
cern level considerably. In some cases, people expressed less
concern after knowing the sensor description since they felt
more confident about the functionality of the sensor. However
in some other cases, our participants became more concerned
after they knew about the sensor description. In this study
however, the concern level is lower than what we examined
before. This could be due to the confidence that our partici-
pants gained about mobile sensors during group activities and
via working with sensor apps in the workshop. However, this
general knowledge about sensors did not contribute to their
inference of possible attacks by sensors on their PINs.
Fig. 6. Self-declared perceived risk of sensors
4.3 General knowledge vs risk perception
Figs. 5 and 6 suggest that there may be a correlation between
the relative level of knowledge users have about sensors and
the relative level of risk they perceive from them. We confirm
our observation of correlation using Spearman’s rank-order
correlation measure [11].
We rank the sensors based on the level of user familiarity,
using the same method applied in each category of sensors in
Fig. 5. Separately, the levels of concern are ranked too. After
applying the Spearman’s equation, the correlation between
the comparative knowledge (median: “I know what this is,
but I don’t know how this works”, Interquartile range (IQR):
“I’ve never heard of this”-“I know very well how this works”)
and the perceived risk about different sensors (median: “Not
concerned”, IQR: “Not concerned”-“A little concerned”) is
r= 0.48 (p<0.05). This together with the results we have
from [23], suggest that there is a moderate/strong correlation
between the general knowledge and perceived risk.
These results support that the more the users know about
these sensors (before being presented with any information),
the more concern they express about the risk of the sensors
revealing PINs (after knowing the sensor description and
working with the sensor app).
74.4 App permissions review
In the final part of the workshop, we asked our participants
to review the permissions of three pre-installed apps on their
devices through the system settings. In this section, the par-
ticipant had the opportunity to go beyond sensor security and
investigate access to all sort of mobile OS resources by apps.
The participants chose a very wide varieties of apps to
investigate the permissions; ranging from social networking,
banking, shopping, discount apps, etc. In most cases, our
participants could successfully identify the functionality of the
chosen app and whether it has reasonable permissions or not.
The decision made by the users for either uninstalling the
app, limiting its access, or leaving it as it was before varied
across users and apps for various reasons as we explain here.
Full detail of these completed app permission review forms is
available via the first author’s homepage.
Uninstalling. Some of our participants expressed their
willingness to uninstall certain apps since they were over-
privileged. In the comment section, the participants explained
that they don’t really need these apps, or they can replace it
by using a web browser, or they are concerned about their
security and privacy. For example, after one of our partici-
pants discovered the permissions they have already given to
Zara app (camera, contacts, location, storage, and telephone),
the participant expressed: “It does not need those things-
uninstalled!”. Similarly another participant could easily infer
that a discount app (Meerkat movies) should not be able to
modify/delete SD card, and decided to remove it.
Disabling/limiting access. There were cases where par-
ticipants could identify the risky extra permissions granted
to apps, but instead of uninstalling the app, they chose to
disable certain accesses, or limit them to while using the app.
For instance, one participant observed that if they disable the
access to contacts, storage, and telephone, Spotify would still
work. Another participant said that they would occasionally
turn off location on Twitter e.g. if they are on holiday. In an-
other example, one of the participants commented: “[I] would
remove photos and camera permissions but still use [Uber]
app”. Another participant commented that they changed the
access to location to while using in Google Maps.
Leaving as before. In some cases, our participants re-
viewed the app permissions and did not find them risky. For
example, when one of our participants found out that Pay by
Phone app has access to camera, the participant commented:
“Camera [is] used to take pictures of payment cards”.
In some other cases, our participants could identify the
over-privileged app, but decided to leave the app and its
permissions as before. They expressed various reasons for
this decision. For example, one participant chose to continue
using Unidays (a discount app) saying that “[I’m] not that
concerned that it has access to photos”. Another participant
said they would not uninstall the Sleep Cycle app since “I find
it useful for self-tracking. I don’t worry about people having
access to that particular information [microphone, motion
and fitness, mobile data] about me.” In another case, while
our participant could list the permissions of MyFitnessPal,
they said they would not uninstall it since: “I am addicted to
it”. Another participant refused to uninstall Pedometer app
expressing: “[I] don’t see the need for [access to] contacts
and storage, but [I would] still use [it] as other apps ask
for the same [permissions].” Another attendee listed camera,
contacts, and location as Groupon’s (extra) permissions, and
commented: “[The app’s] benefits outweigh threats”.
Overall, we observe that this activity (app permission
review) has helped our participants to successfully identity
over-privileged apps. However, different users chose to react
differently on the matter. It seems that this decision making
process was affected by some general mental models such
as the ubiquity of the app, the functionality of the app, its
advantages vs the disadvantages, (not) being worried about
sharing data, and (not) being aware of any real exploit of
these permissions.
5 Discussions
5.1 Replicating studies and experiments
Some parts of this paper are presented as report of replicating
previously published studies and experiments [23]. We have
changed the method of studying people for their general
knowledge and concern about sensors on a new set of partici-
pants. Previously [23], we had interviewed our participants in-
dividually. In contrast, in this paper, we organized a workshop
for all participants to sit together and interact. In addition in
the past, for assessing the concern level, we only provided our
participants with a brief description of sensors. However in
this study, on top of the sensor description, we also offered
our participants to work with a few sensor apps.
The user general knowledge of sensors reported in this
paper confirms our previous results. The level of concern
expressed by our participants in this paper is lower than what
we observed in [23]. This means that working with sensor
apps has decreased the perceived risk level. This is despite the
fact that the workshop description contained some security
words (please see Section 3). While the level of concern in this
study has generally decreased for sensors compared to [23],
for movement sensors, this concern reduction is bigger (except
sensor hub). We suspect that it is because working with sensor
apps makes users more confident about these sensors. On the
other hand, the potential threats to the user security posed
by an unauthorized access to the movement sensors are not
immediately clear. Hence, working with these apps convince
the users that these sensors are benign.
We encourage other researchers to replicate studies and
experiments of this paper as well as those presented in [23].
In this way, the academic community and the sensor industry
will have a better vision on human factors of this emerging
technology with more robust results.
5.2 Recommendations to different stakeholders
After we presented the demonstrated attacks [20]–[23] to our
participants in the workshop, we observed that they are very
shocked about the power of these movement sensors. However,
when completing the app permission review activity, they
could not see whether certain apps have access to these sensors
or not. Hence, even if the mobile users are very well aware of
the risk of these sensors to their security and privacy, since
mobile apps and websites don’t ask for permission for these
sensors, users won’t have the option to disable their access.
One way to fix this problem, which is commonly suggested
by research papers, is to simply ask for permission for all
8sensors. However, it will introduce a lot of usability prob-
lems. People are already ignoring the permission notifications
required for sensors such as camera and microphone. Hence
it is a complex usable security problem. We believe that
more research (both technical and human dimensions) in the
field of sensor security should be carried out by academia.
This research should be conducted in collaboration with the
industry to achieve impactful results. Based on our research,
we conclude the following recommendations:
Educators. Although the amount of technical research
conducted on sensor security is considerable, human dimen-
sions of the technology, especially education aspects, have not
been addressed very well. When we asked for more comments
on improving sensor security at the end of the workshop, one
of the participants commented: “better education/ informa-
tion for smartphone users on what app permissions really
mean, and how [permission setting] can compromise privacy”.
We understand that the focus of technical research might
not be education, hence organizing similar workshops might
not be the priority. However, apart from raising public knowl-
edge awareness, holding such workshops to a non-technical
audience is a strong medium to disseminate technical re-
search. Part two of our workshop was a presentation on our
technical research in Newcastle University. This part can be
replaced with any other research in the field of sensor security,
without diminishing the workshop goal. The feedback from
non-technical audiences will lead a technical research to an
impactful direction.
We have published our workshop slides in order to make
them available for use by educators and the general public.
In addition, we have provided two articles entitled: “Is your
mobile phone spying on you?” and “Auditing your mobile
app permissions” in the Cyber Security: Safety at Home,
Online, in Life online course11, part of Newcastle University’s
series of massive open online courses (MOOCs). We strongly
encourage researchers/educators to produce educational ma-
terials and report their experiences on other methods of sensor
security education.
App and web developers. The fact that working with
sensor apps did not contribute to the users’ risk inference is
worrying. Nevertheless, security and privacy issues are very
low motivations in the adoption of apps. Hence, App and web
developers have a fundamental role in addressing this prob-
lem. As discussed in [1], developers are recommended to secure
tools with proved utility. Many mobile apps in app stores
are “permission hungry” [29]. These extra permission requests
are likely not understood by the majority of developers who
copy and paste this code into their applications, similar to
what is discussed in [10]. This is where app developers end
up inserting extra permission requests into their code. We
advise developers to not copy code from unreliable sources
to their apps. Instead, they should search for stable libraries
and APIs to be used in their apps. Accordingly, including
minimal permission requests in the app would lead to few
security decisions to be made by the users when installing and
using the app.
Moreover, explaining the reason why the app is asking for
certain permissions would improve the user experience. As
an example, when one of our participants found out that O2
11. futurelearn.com/courses/cyber-security
priority (a discount app) has access to location, the partici-
pant commented: “Location allows me to find nearby offers-
app gives explanation”. When we asked for more comments on
improving sensor security at the end of the workshop, one of
the participants wrote: “let the user know why permission is
needed for the app to work and choose which features/permis-
sions are reasonable”.
Mobile users. As we observed in this workshop, mobile
users don’t know that many apps have access to their mobile
OS resources, either without asking for permission or via the
permissions that they ignore. In order to keep their mobile
devices safer, we advise mobile users to follow the general
security practice:
• Some users tend to be lazy in closing apps after fin-
ishing working with them. Close background apps and
web browser tabs when you are not using them.
• Some users can be greedy in installing multiple apps
and keeping them on their devices. Uninstall apps you
no longer need.
• Security patches are being constantly released by the
vendors. Keep your phone OS and apps up to date.
• Installing apps from unknown sources might impose
security risks. Only install applications from approved
app stores where these apps are vet comprehensively.
• Scrutinise the permission requested by apps before you
install them and choose alternatives with more sensible
permissions if needed.
• Try to regularly audit the permissions that apps have
on your device via system settings.
Each of the above items can be developed by educators as
educational material to be taught to mobile users.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we reflected the results of a workshop where
we mainly explained these three to the users: i) the data
generated by mobile sensors, ii) how that data might be
used to undermine their security and privacy, and iii) what
precautionary measure they could and should take. We stud-
ied the impact of teaching mobile users about sensors on
their perceived risk levels for each sensor. The results show
that teaching about general aspects of sensors would not
immediately improve people’s ability to perceive the risks.
On the other hand, when we taught the permission reviewing
technique as a precautionary measure, our participants could
successfully identify over-privileged apps. Users’ decision on
either modifying the app permissions, uninstalling, or keeping
it as before varied due to various reasons. We believe this
suggest that there is a lot of room for more focus on education
about mobile and sensor technology.
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Appendix
In the following, we present a brief description of each sensor:
• GPS: identifies the real-world geographic location.
• Camera, Microphone: capture pictures/videos and
voice, respectively.
• Fingerprint, TouchID: scans the fingerprint.
• Touch Screen: enables the user to interact directly with
the display by physically touching it.
• WiFi: is a wireless technology that allows the device to
connect to a network.
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Sex Age Job/Background Mobile (y)
f 27 Tech communication 7
f 43 Service director 8
f 28 Finance manager 4
f 45 Graphic designer 15
f 23 Designer 6
f 23 Social media 6
f 47 Teacher 9
m 32 Manager 6
f 31 Research director 7
f 29 Costumer service manager 7
f 27 Content strategist 4
f 45 Teacher 10
f 29 Business analyst 7
f 32 Photographer 13
f 46 Management consultant 8
f 24 Research assistant 10
m 32 Student 7
f 51 Development Manager 11
f 28 IT manager 8
f 28 Marketing manager 8
f 31 Digital marketing 7
f 23 Student 7
f 33 Test analyst 8
f 22 HR manager 5
f 30 Teacher 7
f 27 NA 16
m 23 Student 2
f 39 Trainee solicitor 9
f 50 Brand consultant 10
f 44 NA 1
TABLE 3
Participants’ self-reported demographics in the two studies, (y)
indicates the years of owning a smartphone
• Bluetooth: is a wireless technology for exchanging data
over short distances.
• NFC (Near Filed Communication): is a wireless tech-
nology for exchanging data over shorter distances (less
than 10 cm) for purposes such as contacless payment.
• Proximity: measures the distance of objects from the
touch screen.
• Ambient Light: measures the light level in the environ-
ment of the device.
• Ambient Pressure (Barometer), Ambient Humidity,
and Ambient Temperature: measure the air pressure,
humidity, and temperature in the environment of the
device, respectively.
• Device Temperature: measures the temperature of the
device.
• Gravity: measures the force of gravity.
• Magnetic Field: reports the ambient magnetic field
intensity around the device.
• Hall Sensor: produces voltage based on the magnetic
field.
• Accelerometer: measures the acceleration of the device
movement or vibration.
• Rotation: reports how much and in what direction the
device is rotated.
• Gyroscope: estimates the rotation rate of the device.
• Motion: measures the acceleration and the rotation of
the device.
• Orientation: reports the physical angle that the device
is held in.
• Sensor Hub: is an activity recognition sensor and its
purpose is to monitor the device’s movement.
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Sensor I’ve never I’ve heard I know what I know I know
heard of this of this but I this is but I generally very well
don’t know don’t know how this how this
what this is how this works works works
Bluetooth
Gyroscope
GPS
Sensor Hub
Ambient Temperature
Accelerometer
Magnetic Field
Motion
Fingerprint
Orientation
Proximity
Ambient Pressure
Hall Sensor
Rotation
Touch Screen
Camera
TouchID
Barometer
Gravity
Microphone
Ambient Humidity
WiFi
Ambient Light
NFC
Device Temperature
TABLE 4
This form was used for activity one
Risk to PIN
Not A little Moderately Extremely
Sensor Concerned Concerned Concerned Concerned Concerned
Bluetooth
Gyroscope
GPS
Sensor Hub
Ambient Temperature
Accelerometer
Magnetic Field
Motion
Fingerprint
Orientation
Proximity
Ambient Pressure
Hall Sensor
Rotation
Touch Screen
Camera
TouchID
Barometer
Gravity
Microphone
Ambient Humidity
WiFi
Ambient Light
NFC
Device Temperature
TABLE 5
This form was used for activity six
No. App name Purpose (Extra) permissions Would you uninstall? Why?
1
2
3
TABLE 6
This form was used for activity eight
